The rank of a bimatrix game (A, B) is defined as rank(A + B). Computing a Nash equilibrium (NE) of a rank-0, i.e., zero-sum game is equivalent to linear programming (von Neumann'28, Dantzig'51). In 2005, Kannan and Theobald gave an FPTAS for constant rank games, and asked if there exists a polynomial time algorithm to compute an exact NE. Adsul et. al. (2011) answered this question affirmatively for rank-1 games, leaving rank-2 and beyond unresolved.
INTRODUCTION
Two player, finite, non-cooperative games constitute the most simple and fundamental model within game theory [25] , and have been studied extensively for their computational and structural properties. Such a game can be represented by two payoff matrices (A, B), one for each player, and therefore are also known as bimatrix games. Von Neumann (1928) showed that in games where one player's loss is the other player's gain (B = −A, zero-sum), the min-max strategies are stable [32] . This turned out to be equivalent to linear programming (LP) [15, 2] and therefore polynomialtime computable. In 1950, John Nash [26] extended this notion to formulate an equilibrium concept, and proved its existence for finite multi-player games. It has since been named Nash equilibrium (NE) and is perhaps the most important and well-studied solution concept in game theory.
The classical Lemke-Howson algorithm (1964) [22] , to compute Nash equilibrium in general bimatrix games, performs very well in practice. However it may take exponential time in the worst case [29] . Other methods that followed [21, 31] are also similar in nature [6, 19] , and a complexity theoretic study of the problem was called for. Henceforth, by 2-Nash we mean computing a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game.
The complexity class NP is not applicable for 2-Nash, because an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist [26] . However, computing a special kind of NE, for numerous special properties, has been shown to be NP-complete [18, 14] . In 1994 Papadimitriou introduced complexity class PPAD [27] , Polynomial Parity Argument for Directed graph, for problems with path following argument for existence, like Sperner's lemma [30] . He showed that 2-Nash, among many other problems, is in PPAD. After more than a decade, the problem was shown to be PPAD-hard in a remarkable series of works [16, 11] . Chen et. al. [11] showed that even On the positive side, polynomial-time algorithms were developed for many special classes of games. Among these, one of the most significant is the class of constant rank games defined by Kannan and Theobald (2005) -rank of game (A, B) is defined as rank(A+B). They gave an FPTAS for constant rank games, 1 and asked if there is an efficient algorithm to compute an exact NE in these games. Note that, rank-0 are zero-sum games, and therefore are polynomial-time solvable. For rank-1 games, Adsul et. al. [4] gave a polynomial time algorithm, by reducing the problem to 1-dimensional fixedpoint, however rank-2 and beyond remained unresolved.
In this paper we show that NE computation in games with rank ≥ 3 is PPAD-hard, settling a decade long open problem. Since there is an FPTAS for constant rank games, this result comes as a surprise, because until now whenever a problem, in games or markets, was shown to be PPAD-hard, so was its approximation (i.e., no FPTAS unless PPAD=P) [11, 10, 1, 8, 20] .
To obtain the result, we reduce 2D-Brouwer, a two dimensional discrete fixed point problem which is known to be PPAD-hard [7] , to a rank-3 game. The reduction is done in two steps. First we reduce 2D-Brouwer to 2D-Linear-FIXP; Linear-FIXP [17] is a class of fixed-point problems with polynomial piecewise-linear functions, and kD-Linear-FIXP is its subclass consisting of k-dimensional fixed-point problems. In the second step, we reduce an instance of 2D-Linear-FIXP to a rank-3 bimatrix game, such that a linear function of Nash equilibrium strategies of the resulting game gives fixed-points of the 2D-Linear-FIXP instance.
Our reduction completely bypasses the machinery of graphical games and game gadgets, central to the previous approaches, and instead exploits relations between LPs, linear complementarity problems (LCPs) and bimatrix games. Such a conceptual leap seems to be necessary to show hardness of constant rank games, since the game gadgets used previously inherently give rise to higher rank games. Our approach also provides a simpler proof for PPAD-hardness of 2-Nash, and may be of independent interest to show hardness for other problems, and to understand connections between parameterized LPs and bimatrix games. We can achieve further simplification by avoiding even the parameterized LP, but the resulting game turns out to be of high rank (see [23] for details).
Apart from the hardness of constant rank games, a number of results follow as corollaries from our reduction. The first step shows PPAD-hardness of 2D-Linear-FIXP and thereby improves the equivalence result Linear-FIXP = PPAD of Etessami and Yannakakis to 2D-Linear-FIXP = PPAD. This also implies 2D-Linear-FIXP = Linear-FIXP; in other words the class of Linear-FIXP remains unchanged even when functions are restricted to two dimensions. Since, an instance of 1D-Linear-FIXP can be solved in polynomial time using binary search, our result establishes a dichotomy between 1D and kD, k ≥ 2 Linear-FIXP problems; the former are in P and the latter are PPAD-complete. Our approach can be extended to reduce kD-Brouwer to kD-Linear-FIXP to rank-(k + 1) games, where the reduction from kD-Linear-FIXP to rank-(k + 1) games (almost) preserves the number of solutions. Using this, together with a result from [17] , we show that bimatrix games with con-
k poly(n) time algorithm to compute an -approximate Nash equilibrium in a rank-k n × n game of bit size L. vex set of NE are no easier. In fact they are as hard as solving simple stochastic games, which are known to be in NP ∩ coNP [12] , however despite significant efforts its exact complexity remains open [13, 5] . Further, we can show that computing weak
-approximate fixed-point of a function in Linear-FIXP is also PPAD-hard (see [23] for details). It will be interesting to see if this can be extended to show hardness of approximation in 2-Nash.
Since NE computation in a rank-k game can be reduced to computing symmetric NE of a symmetric game with rank2k [28] , we get that computing symmetric Nash equilibria in symmetric games with rank ≥ 6 is PPAD-hard. Again computing symmetric NE in symmetric rank-0 games can be solved using LP, and for rank-1 games recently Mehta et. al. [24] gave a polynomial-time algorithm. This leaves the status of symmetric games with rank between 2 and 5 unresolved. Also the status of rank-2 bimatrix games remains unresolved.
Overview of the Reduction
In this section we explain the main ideas behind the reductions: from 2D-Brouwer to 2D-Linear-FIXP, and then to rank-3 game. We start with a brief description of 2D-Brouwer and Linear-FIXP problems.
2D-Brouwer is a class of 2-dimensional discrete fixed-point problems, known to be PPAD-hard [9] . An instance of 2D-Brouwer consists of a grid Gn = {0, . . . , 2 n −1}×{0, . . . , 2 n − 1} and a valid coloring function g : Gn → {0, 1, 2} which satisfies some boundary conditions, and thereby ensures existence of a trichromatic unit square in the grid. 3 The problem is to find one such trichromatic square (see Section 2.2 for details). Function g is specified by a Boolean circuit C b with 2n input bits; n bits to represent each of the two co-ordinate of a grid point. n in Linear-FIXP is defined by a circuit, say C, with n real inputs and outputs, and {max, +, * ζ} operations, where * ζ is multiplication by a rational constant (see Section 2.3 for details). Such a function has rational fixed-points of size polynomial in the input size [17] . We denote the class of k-dimensional fixed-point problems in Linear-FIXP by kDLinear-FIXP.
Given circuit C b of a 2D-Brouwer instance, in Section 3 we construct a 2D-Linear-FIXP circuit C such that all the fixed-points of the function F defined by C are in trichromatic unit squares of the grid Gn. It is easy to simulate C b in C by replacing ∧, ∨ and ¬ with min, max and (1 − x) respectively, if input to this simulation is guaranteed to be Boolean. To guarantee this, we need to extract bit representation of p , for a p ∈ [0, 2
Since, floor is a discontinuous function it can not be simulated using Linear-FIXP circuit, whose operations can generate only continuous functions. However, we design a bit extraction gadget which does the job for almost all the points, except those that are close to the boundary of unit squares of Gn. Finally, using a sampling lemma similar to that of [11] we ensure that the fixed-points of the function defined by the resulting circuit C are always in trichromatic unit squares of the grid Gn, and we get, Etessami and Yannakakis [17] showed that Linear-FIXP = PPAD. Theorem 2 improves this to 2D-Linear-FIXP = PPAD, and in turn we get Linear-FIXP = 2D-Linear-FIXP, i.e., fixed-point problems with polynomial piecewise-linear functions in constant (two) dimension are as hard as those in n-dimension.
Next, we reduce the fixed-point computation of a kDLinear-FIXP instance to Nash equilibrium computation in a rank-(k + 1) game (see Section 4). Let λ = (λ1, . . . , λ k ) denote the k inputs of circuit C of the given kD-Linear-FIXP instance. First we replace circuit C by a parameterized linear program LP (λ), so that circuit evaluation for a given input is same as solving the LP. This is done as follows: There is an ordering among max gates since C forms a DAG. Suppose xi captures the output of the i th max gate. Since the + and * ζ operations of circuit C generates only linear expressions, for xj = max{L, R}, L and R both are linear expression in x1, . . . , xj−1 and λ. Further, this max operation is equivalent to xj ≥ L, xj ≥ R, (xj − L)(xj − R) = 0. The first two linear conditions define the feasible region of LP, where xjs are variables and λis are parameters. Note that, r.h.s. of the constraints of LP is parameterized by (λ1, . . . , λ k ), and the constraint matrix is lower triangular. Using this property we show that ∃c such that for all λ, min : c T x over this feasible region will ensure the quadratic constraints as well for each max gate. This gives the LP (λ) which can replace circuit C.
Since, primal-dual feasibility, and complementary slackness characterizes solutions of an LP, LP is a special case of linear complementarity problem (LCP). Using this connection for LP (λ), we construct an LCPC whose solutions exactly capture the fixed point of the given kD-Linear-FIXP instance (Section 4.2). Further, the matrix of the LCP turns out to be off-block-diagonal, with the two blocks in off-diagonal adding up to a rank-k matrix. Finally, using the fact that the LCP capturing Nash equilibria of a bimatrix game also has a off-block-diagonal matrix, we construct a bimatrix game, whose Nash equilibria are in one-to-one correspondence with the solutions of LCPC . The rank of the resulting game turns out to be (k + 1), and one of its payoff matrix is upper-triangular. Theorem 2, together with the reduction from 2-Nash to symmetric2-Nash [28] , implies that computing symmetric NE of a symmetric game with rank ≥ 6 is PPAD-hard.
PRELIMINARIES
To show the hardness of rank-3 games, we start with 2D-Brouwer, reduce it to Linear-FIXP and then to a bimatrix game. In this section we discuss each of these problems separately. First we describe a characterization of Nash equilibria in bimatrix games, and the class of 2D-Brouwer problems. Both the problems are known to be PPAD-complete [11, 9] . Next, we describe Linear-FIXP [17] 
Bimatrix games and Nash equilibrium
A bimatrix game is a two player game, where each player has finitely many pure strategies (moves). Let Si, i = 1, 2 be the set of strategies of player i, and let m def = |S1| and n def = |S2|. Then such a game can be represented by two payoff matrices A and B, each of m × n dimension.
Players may randomize among their strategies; a randomized play is called a mixed strategy. Let the set of mixed strategies of the first player be 
It is easy to obtain the following characterization for NE.
The next lemma follows from the above discussion. 
Gn is a function g from the vertices of Gn to {0, 1, 2}. Function g is said to be valid if for every vertex (p1, p2) on the boundary of Gn, we have
Let Kp denote the unit square with p at the bottom left corner. Due to Sperner's Lemma it is known that for any valid coloring of g of Gn there exists a vertex p ∈ Gn such that vertices of Kp have all the three colors -trichromatic.
2D-Brouwer Mapping Circuit:
Consider a Boolean circuit C b generating valid coloring on grid Gn. 5 The circuit has 2n input bits, n bits for each of the two integers representing a grid point, and 4 output bits Δ
It is a valid Brouwer-mapping circuit if the following is true:
• For every p ∈ Gn, the 4 output bits of C b satisfies one of the following 3 cases: • For every p on the boundary of Gn, if p2 = 0 then Case 2 is satisfied, if p1 = 0 and p2 = 0 then Case 1 is satisfied, and for the rest Case 0 is satisfied.
Definition 5 (2D-Brouwer [9]). The input to the 2D-Brouwer consists of a valid Brouwer-mapping circuit C
b that produces a valid coloring on Gn. The problem is to find a point p ∈ G k such that Kp is trichromatic.
The size of the given 2D-Brouwer problem is size [C b ], which is #input nodes + #output nodes + # gates.
The outputs of the circuit (defining a color), can also be mapped to incremental vector (Δ
. Let e i be the incremental vector corresponding to Case (color) i, then clearly, e 0 = (−1, −1), e 1 = (1, 0) and
It is easy to see that if C
b is a valid Brouwer-mapping circuit, then H is Gn → Gn, and vertices of a trichromatic square Kp goes in each of the e i direction under H. Chen and Deng showed finding such a square is PPAD-hard [9] .
Linear-FIXP
Etessami and Yannakakis [17] defined the class FIXP to capture complexity of the exact fixed point problems with algebraic solutions. An instance I of FIXP consists of an algebraic circuit CI defining a function FI :
, and the problem is to compute a fixed-point of FI . The circuit is a finite representation of function FI (like a formula), consisting of {max, +, * } operations, and rational constants.
The circuit CI is a sequence of gates g1, . . . , gm, where for 
d , all the gates of CI are well defined and
We note that a circuit representing a problem in FIXP operates on real numbers, but the underlying model of computation is still the standard discrete Turing machine. In other words, an algorithm for FIXP problems is not allowed to do computation on reals.
Let * ζ denote multiplication by a rational constant ζ ∈ Q. The Linear-FIXP is a subclass of FIXP where the operations are restricted to • ∈ {max, +, * ζ}. A function defined by a Linear-FIXP circuit is polynomial piecewise-linear, and all its fixed points are rational numbers of size poly(L) [17] , where L is the total size of the circuit which is #inputs + #gates + total size of the constants used in the circuit. Etessami and Yannakakis showed that PPAD = Linear-FIXP. Next, we define a subclass of Linear-FIXP based on the number of inputs and outputs.
e., FI is defined by a circuit with k inputs and k outputs.
Since fixed-point of a 1-dimensional piecewise-linear function can be computed in polynomial time using a binary search, kD-Linear-FIXP is in P for k = 1. But for any constant k > 1 it is not clear if the problem is in P or it is hard. In the next section, we show that the problem is PPAD-hard even for k = 2.
PPAD-HARDNESS OF 2D-LINEAR-FIXP
In this section we describe the construction of a Linear-FIXP circuit with two inputs and two outputs, from an instance of 2D-Brouwer defined by a Boolean Brouwer-mapping circuit. We show that the function defined by the resulting 2D-Linear-FIXP circuit is such that all its fixed-points are in trichromatic squares of the 2D-Brouwer instance, thereby proving PPAD-hardness of 2D-Liner-FIXP using [9] .
Let C b be the valid Brouwer-mapping circuit of a given 2D-Brouwer instance on grid Gn, and H be the discrete function defined by circuit C b . We construct a Linear-FIXP circuit C that computes a function
2 , an extension of the discrete function H.
Recall that given a bit representation of a grid point p ∈ Gn, circuit C b outputs four bits Δ
Similarly, for every non-grid point p = (p1, p2) ∈ Kq, we need to compute an incremental vector based on the incremental vectors of the vertices of Kq. For this we need to extract the integer parts of p1 and p2, i.e., compute p1 and p2 , and then its bit representation. Since, floor is a discontinuous function, it can not be computed using Linear-FIXP operations, which are inherently continuous. However, next we achieve this for the points not very near to the boundary of any cell.
Recall that the operations allowed in a Linear-FIXP circuit are {max, +, * ζ}. Clearly, {min, −} can be simulated using the allowed operations. Let L > 16 be a large integer with value being a power of 2, and at most polynomial in
Consider the ExtractBits procedure of Table 1 . 
2 + 1 ≤ 0 and hence bn−1 will be zero. In either case x = a − bn−12 n−1 will satisfy the hypothesis, and we can apply the same argument for bit bn−2.
Given a well positioned point p ∈ Kq, we can extract bit representations of each of the coordinates of q due to Lemma 8,  ] . This is expected due to continuity property of Linear-FIXP operations. Similar difficulty arises in the approaches of Daskalakis et al. [16] and Chen et al. [11] . Both resort to a sampling argument, first proposed in [16] , and later improved in [11] . Next we describe a version of [11] argument.
Given a set of points S = {p 1 , . . . , p l }, let Iw(S) and Ip(S) denote the set of indices of the well and poorly positioned points of S respectively. Given p ∈ R 
For each j ∈ Ip(S), let r j ∈ R 2 be a vector with r
Remark 10. Note that, in Lemma 9 , it suffices to assume 16 j=1 r j ∞ < 1 for p to be in a trichromatic square. We use this fact to derive inapproximability results in [23] .
Lemma 9 implies that even if point p is poorly positioned, we can make sure that it forms a fixed-point only when it is in a trichromatic square by sampling 16 carefully chosen points near it. Next we describe a complete construction of the Linear-FIXP circuit C, and then show its correctness using Lemmas 8 and 9. S1. Let p1 and p2 denote the two inputs of the Linear-FIXP circuit. These are any real number from [0, 2 n − 1]. Compute 16 points using the + gates and rational constants:
S2. Call ExtractBits(p S6. Output p 1 = max{min{p1 + r1, 2 n − 1}, 0} and p 2 = max{min{p2 + r2, 2 n − 1}, 0}.
The number of gates used in steps S1, S4, S5 and S6 of the above procedure are constant. We used O(n) gates in step S2, and 16 times as many as the number of gates in C b in step S3. Further, since value of L is polynomial in size [C b ], the constants used in steps S1, S2 and S5 are polynomial sized. Thus, the total size of the Linear-FIXP circuit C constructed by the above procedure is polynomial in size [C b ]. Next we show that each of the fixed-points of function F represented by circuit C are in trichromatic squares of the grid Gn.
Lemma 11. Every fixed point of F is inside a trichromatic square of Gn.
It is easy to shrink the range of F from [0, 2 
REDUCTION: KD-LINEAR-FIXP TO RANK-(K+1) GAME

Given a kD-Linear-FIXP instance, with function
represented by circuit C, in this section we construct a rank-(k + 1) bimatrix game whose Nash equilibria are almost 6 in one-to-one correspondence with the fixed points of F . We do this in two steps. First we replace the circuit C, by a parametric linear program (LP) with kparameters, where inputs of circuit C become parameters of the LP. Given values of the k inputs, we show that the k outputs of the circuit C are linear function of a solution of the LP. This defines a function F lp from R k to R k , and we show that the fixed points of F lp are in one to one correspondence with the fixed-points of F . Later, we construct a rank-(k + 1) game using the LP and its dual, whose Nash equilibria exactly captures the fixed points of F lp .
Remark 13. Recall that linear programs are equivalent to zero-sum games [15, 2] . However, the reductions from LP to zero-sum games constructs a symmetric game, and require to compute a symmetric Nash equilibrium. There are no such restrictions in our construction, however our reduction is not general enough and uses the fact that the parametric LP has been constructed from a Linear-FIXP circuit. It will be interesting to reduce an LP to a non-symmetric zero-sum game, and also a fixed-point problem with parametric LP to a constant rank game in general.
Replacing Linear-FIXP circuit with a linear program
In this section we construct a parameterized linear program with k parameters, which can replace a kD-Linear-FIXP circuit. Let C be a kD-Linear-FIXP circuit representing the function F :
Circuit C being a Linear-FIXP circuit, it allows only three operations, namely max, + and * ζ where ζ is a rational number, and it forms a DAG. The size[C] is # inputs +# gates +# total bit lengths of the constants in the circuit.
If C is considered as a function from R k to R k , then it is same as function F on [0, 1] k , but can be anything outside this range and hence may have fixed-points outside [0, 1] k as well. To prevent this, we add two max gates for every output of the circuit, as follows: Let τ1, . . . , τ k be the k outputs of circuit C. Without loss of generality (wlog), we will add two max gates for each l ∈ [k] to ensure that each output value is in [0, 1]:
The above transformation ensures that the output vector of C is always in [0, 1] k , and hence fixed-points of C are exactly the fixed-points of F . Next, we show that it is wlog to assume that one of the inputs of every max gate is zero.
Lemma 14. Given a circuit C, it can be transformed to an equivalent polynomial sized circuit where one of the inputs of every max gate is zero.
Proof. Consider a max gate, and let a and b be the inputs and c be the output, then we have c = max{a, b} which is equivalent to c = max{0, b − a} + a. Therefore, we can transform circuit C such that one input of every max gate is 0. This transformation requires 3 extra gates per max gate, two + and one * ζ where ζ = −1. Clearly, the increase in the size of the circuit is polynomial.
Wlog we assume that every max gate of circuit C has exactly one non-trivial input, and the other input is always zero (due to Lemma 14) . Let m be the number of max gates in C. Since C is a DAG, there is an ordering among the max gates, say g1, . . . , gm, such that if there is a path from gi to gj in C then i < j; ties are broken arbitrarily. Let n = m − 2k be the number of max gate in the original circuit, before the addition of (1) per output. Let these be the first n max gates. In (1) let g n+2l−1 denote the inner max gate and g n+2l denote the outer one, then k outputs of circuit are the outputs of gates
Let the k inputs of circuit C be denoted by λ = (λ1, . . . λ k ), and let xi capture the output of the i th max gate. Note that, x n+2l , l ∈ [k] are the output of the circuit. Except for the max, rest of the two operations give rise to linear expressions in the λ and xis of the previous max gates. We use this observation crucially in the rest of the construction.
Note that, for each i ∈ [m], the input of gi is a linear expression in x1, . . . , xi−1, λ1, . . . , λ k , with a constant term. We denote this expression by Li(x1, . . . , xi−1, λ) , then the following conditions exactly capture the operation of gi.
The next lemma follows by construction. (2) and (3) iff when λ is given as the input to circuit C, the i th max gate evaluates to xi for all i ∈ [m].
Proof. Reverse direction follows just by construction. For the forward direction we will argue by induction. Suppose, (x, λ) satisfies (2) and (3). Then, for λ as input to C, clearly L1 evaluates to exactly the input of the (first max) gate g1. In that case, (2) forces that x1 is at least as large as inputs of g1, and (3) forces that it equals one of the input. Thus, x1 captures output of g1. Now, suppose this is true for first k ≥ 1 max gates. Then for (k +1) th max gate, again L k+1 is exactly the input of g k+1 , and the lemma follows by the same argument.
Constraints of (2) gives a system of linear inequalities,
where, b and u l , l ∈ [k] are m-dimensional rational vectors, and A is an m×m lower-triangular rational matrix with ones on the diagonal. Once we plugin some values for λ1, . . . , λ k , (4) becomes a polyhedron in x. Let it be denoted by P(λ). For any λ ∈ R k and x ∈ P(λ), vector (x, λ), satisfies (2).
Remark 16. Enforcing (3) requires quadratic complementarity-type constraints. Using this fact, in [23] we give a simplified proof of PPAD-harness of 2-Nash and symmetric 2-Nash (bypassing even the parameterized LPs).
Next, we construct a cost vector c ∈ R m , such that minimizing x T · c over P(λ) will give a solution that, together with λ, satisfies (3) as well. (2) 
and (3).
Proof. (⇒) Let y be the dual solution corresponding to x, i.e., (x, y) satisfies (6) . Since x is a feasible point of LP (λ), clearly, (x, λ) satisfies (2). For (3) , it suffices to show that ∀i ∈ [m], xi > 0 ⇒ yi > 0, then the proof follows using (6) .
Let β ∈ R m be the vector calculated in ConstructCost(A) of Table 2 (2) and (3) then clearly x is feasible in LP (λ). Construct y, from ym to y1 as follows: if xr = 0 then set yr = 0, else set yr = cr − j>r ajryj. It is easy to see that y is feasible in DLP (λ), and it, together with (x, λ) satisfies (6).
Lemmas 15 and 17 imply that LP (λ) simulates the circuit. Next, we show that the circuit can be replaced by LP (λ) without affecting the fixed-points of F . Consider function
, where x = LP (λ) (7) We show that function F lp is well-defined, and its fixedpoints are exactly the fixed-points of F .
Lemma 18. F
lp is well defined, and λ ∈ R k is a fixedpoint of F lp iff it is a fixed point of F .
Proof. For any given λ ∈ R k , using Lemmas 15 and 17, it follows that LP (λ) has a unique solution, and if it is x then 0 ≤ x n+2l ≤ 1, ∀l ∈ [k]. Thus, F lp is well defined. For the second part, we know that
Since, λ is a fixed point, this also forces λ ∈ [0, 1] k . Further, since circuit C represents the function F in range [0, 1] k , it suffices to show that F lp (λ) = C(λ). In other words, when vector λ is the input to circuit C, then i th max gate evaluates to xi, ∀i ∈ [m], where x = LP (λ). This follows using Lemmas 15 and 17.
Lemma 19. Size of matrix A, and vectors c, b and u
Proof. By construction A, b and u l , ∀l ∈ [k], are formed by the coefficients of the linear expressions Lis of (2). These linear expressions are constructed due to the + and * ζ gates of the circuit C, therefore, the absolute value of any of its co-efficient is at most ζ v max , where v is the number of * ζ gates in C, and ζmax is the maximum absolute rational constant used in C. For rational constants ζ1, ζ2, since size(ζ1 * ζ2) = size(ζ1) + size(ζ2), we have that the size of every coefficient of Lis is at most size [C] . Thus, sizes of A, b and
n (see Table 2 ). Therefore, the size of c is also bounded by a polynomial in size [C] .
From Lemmas 18 and 19 we can conclude that finding a fixed point of F is equivalent to finding one for function F lp , which can be represented using polynomially many bits in the size [C] . Next we reduce the fixed-point computation in F lp to Nash equilibrium computation in a rank-(k + 1) game, such that the size of the game is polynomial in size of the parameters of function F lp .
Constructing Rank-(k+1) Game
Since, feasibility and complementary slackness are necessary and sufficient conditions for the solutions of an LP, it is well known that an LP can be formulated as a linear complementarity problem (LCP). Using this, next we construct an LCP whose solutions are exactly the fixed points of F lp . Before we do this, note that since all the co-ordinates of the cost vector c are strictly positive, we can make it all ones vector by dividing j th column of A by cj. Let H be the transformed matrix, i.e.,
Hij = A ij/c j
To reflect this transformation in LPs of (5) define, 
Using the above observation, and feasibility and complementary slackness conditions for (8), we construct the following LCP, called LCPC ,
Before we connect the solutions of LCPC with the fixedpoints of F lp , we need to establish a few properties about H, H , b and u l s. For this we need to understand (2) for the last 2k max gates that we added in (1) to ensure that the outcome of the circuit is in [0, 1] k . Due to Lemma 14 we have assumed that one of the inputs of every max gate is zero. For this to be the case, the (1) has to be transformed as follows, linear expression in x1, . . . , xn, λ, and in turn so is L n+2l−1 = 1 − τ l . Recall that x n+2l−1 captures the output of the inner max gate and x n+2l captures the output of the outer max gate. Therefore, we have
The following properties are easy to obtain using (10) .
, note that x n+2l appears only in one constraint. Thus n + 2l th column of A is a unit vector with n + 2l th co-ordinate set to one, and hence
P3. From (P2) and the ConstructCost procedure it follows that c n+2l = 1, ∀l ∈ [k]. Therefore, the non-zero co-
P4. Since Hij = A ij/c j , we get that ∀l ∈ [k], (H T y) n+2l = y n+2l (using (P2) and (P3)), and (H x) n+2l ≥ b n+2l ≡ x n+2l−1/c n+2l−1 + x n+2l ≥ 1 (using (P1) and (P3)).
The above properties are crucial to the over all reduction.
Lemma 21. Vector (x , y ) is a solution of LCPC of (9) if and only if λ ∈ [0, 1] k , where
Proof. (⇒) Let (x , y ) be a solution of LCPC . Then by construction of LCPC , clearly x and y are solutions of LP (λ) and DLP (λ) respectively, where
. Set y = y , and x be such that xj = x j/c j , then using Lemma 20 we get that, x and y are solutions of LP (λ) and DLP (λ). Further, property P3 ensures that x n+2l = x n+2l = λ l , ∀l ∈ [k]. Thus, λ is a fixed-point of F lp . (⇐) Let λ be a fixed-point of F lp and let x and y be the solutions of LP (λ) and DLP (λ). Let y = y and x j = cjxj, ∀j ∈ [m], then using Lemma 20 we get that x and y are solutions of LP (λ) and DLP (λ) respectively. Using the fact that λ is a fixed-point of F lp and property
In that case, feasibility and complementary slackness of LP (λ) and DLP (λ), ensures that (x , y ) is a solution of LCPC .
Next, we capture solutions of LCPC as Nash equilibria of a bimatrix game. Consider the following game:
where 1 and 0 are m-dimensional vectors of 1s and 0s respectively. Number of strategies of both the players is m + 1. Let (x, s) and (ỹ, t) denote mixed-strategy vectors of the first player and the second player, then we have, The property that matrix of LCPC is semi-monotone, shown in the next lemma, is important to derive equivalence between the NE of (Ã,B) and the solutions of LCPC . 
On the other hand, ∃l ∈ [k] with z n+2l > 0 and (M z) n+2l ≤ 0 then done. Otherwise, we have z n+2l > 0 and (M z) n+2l > 0. This gives (M z) n+2l = y n+2l = z m+n+2l > 0 and
If ((x, s), (ỹ, t) ) is a Nash equilibrium of game (Ã,B), the following have to be satisfied (see Lemma 4 for the NE characterization), where π1 and π2 are the scalars capturing payoffs of the first and the second player respectively.
Proof. Since, s > 0 and t > 0, we have π1 = t and π2 = s respectively (using (13)). Replacing π1 and π2 accordingly in the inequalities of (13), we get
Dividing the first expression of first line by t and of second line by s, and the second expression in both lines by s * t, we get constraints of LCPC .Thus (x s ,ỹ t ) is a solution of the LCP. The second part is easy to verify using the formulation of LCPC (9) and NE conditions (12) and (13) .
Lemma 24 shows that NE of game (Ã,B) with s > 0, t > 0 exactly capture the solutions of LCPC . Next lemma shows that these are the only NE of this game.
Lemma 25. If ((x, s), (ỹ, t) ) is a Nash equilibrium of game (Ã,B) then s > 0 and t > 0.
Proof. We will derive a contradiction for each of the three cases separately. Case 1: s > 0 and t = 0 Then, we have π1 = t = 0 and therefore, H Tỹ ≤ 0. Since H T is upper-triangular with strictly positive values on the diagonal, the only solution of H Tỹ ≤ 0 isỹ = 0, which contradicts the fact that co-ordinates of vector (ỹ, t) sums to one (see (12) Proof. From circuit C of F construct F lp of (7), then LCPC of (9) from F lp , and finally game (Ã,B) of (11) from the LCP. Using Lemmas 18 and 21 it follows that solution vectors x of LCPC are in one-to-one correspondence with the fixed point of F lp , which are exactly the fixed points of function F in Linear-FIXP that we started with.
Further, the Nash equilibrium (x, s), (ỹ, t)) of game (Ã,B) maps to a solution (x s ,ỹ t ) of LCPC (due to Lemmas 24 and 25) . And, two NE with distinct first players strategies (x, s) = (x , s ) can not map to the same x in a solution of LCPC . If they do, then we havex
Thus we get a game (Ã,B) whose Nash equilibrium strategies of the first player are in one-to-one correspondence with the fixed points of F . Since Etessami and Yannakakis [17] showed that solving a simple stochastic games reduces to computing a unique fixedpoint of a Linear-FIXP problem. Note that if the Linear-FIXP instance that we start with has a unique fixed-point then the resulting game in Theorem 26 will have a unique Nash equilibrium strategy of the first player. In that case, the NE strategies of the second player should form a convex set because they are essentially solutions of a feasibility lp (follows Lemma 4) . Using this together with the result of [17] , we get the following.
Corollary 30. Nash equilibrium computation in bimatrix games with a convex set of Nash equilibria is as hard as solving a simple stochastic game.
Chen et. al. [11] showed PPAD-hardness for NE computation in bimatrix games (2-Nash), which also implies that symmetric NE computation in symmetric bimatrix game is PPAD-hard (symmetric 2-Nash) as the former reduces to the latter (discussed in Section 2). Theorem 27 gives an alternative proof of these facts. The Chen et. al. reduction goes through generalized circuit (similar to Linear-FIXP circuit) with fuzzy gates, graphical games, and game gadgets to simulate each gate of the generalized circuit separately. Our reduction bypasses all of these completely, and provides a simpler reduction using the connections between LPs, LCPs and bimatrix games. In [23] we give further simplified proof for PPAD-hardness of 2-Nash and symmetric 2-Nash, bypassing even the parameterized LP.
DISCUSSION
In this paper we show that Nash equilibrium computation in bimatrix games with rank≥ 3 is PPAD-hard by reducing 2D-Brouwer to rank-3 games. Given an instance of 2D-Brouwer first we reduce it to 2D-Linear-FIXP, a 2-dimensional fixed-point problem defined by a Linear-FIXP circuit with two inputs. Next we replace the circuit by a parameterized linear program with two parameters, and finally using the connections between LPs and LCPs, and LCPs and bimatrix games, we construct a rank-3 game. This, last step of the reduction uses the fact that the parameterized linear program was constructed from a Linear-FIXP circuit. It will be interesting to reduce a fixed-point problem, defined by a parameterized LP, to a bimatrix game in general. This will extend the classical construction of zero-sum games from linear programs by Dantzig [15] . If fixed-point problem with k-parameter LP can be reduced to a rank-k game, then it will imply that rank-2 games are also PPAD-hard, settling the only unresolved case.
As corollaries of our reduction, we get that 2D-Linear-FIXP = PPAD = Linear-FIXP, and in turn a sharp dichotomy on complexity of Linear-FIXP problems; 1D-Linear-FIXP is in P, while for k ≥ 2, kD-Linear-FIXP is PPAD-complete. We also give an explicit construction of a rank-(k + 1) game from a kD-Linear-FIXP problem. This construction (almost) preserves the number of solutions (in terms of NE strategies of the first player), and is different from all the previous approaches. This should be of useful to understand the connections between problems that reduces to Linear-FIXP, and bimatrix games. One such example is Corollary 30 which shows that even if Nash equilibrium set of a bimatrix game is guaranteed to be convex, finding one is as hard as solving a simple stochastic game.
For the case of symmetric games, the PPAD-hardness of rank-3 games imply that computing a symmetric Nash equilibrium in a symmetric rank-6 games is PPAD-hard. The polynomial time algorithm for computing symmetric NE of a rank-1 symmetric games by Mehta et. al. [24] leaves the status of symmetric games with rank-2 to rank-5 unresolved.
